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Abstract
Symbolic execution of a language is traditionally achieved by re-
placing the language’s interpreter with an entirely new interpreter.
This may be an unnecessary burden, and it is tempting instead to try
to use as much of the existing interpret infrastructure as possible,
both for handling aspects of the computation that are not symbolic,
and for propagating symbolic ones.
This approach was used to implement Rubicon, a bounded ver-
ification system for Ruby on Rails web applications, in less than
1000 lines of Ruby code. Rubicon uses symbolic execution to de-
rive verification conditions from Rails applications and an off-the-
shelf solver to check them. Despite its small size, Rubicon has been
used to find previously unknown bugs in open-source Rails appli-
cations.
The key idea is to encode symbolic values and operations in
a library written in the target language itself, overriding only a
small part of the standard interpreter. We formalize this approach,
showing that replacing a few key operators with symbolic versions
in a standard interpreter gives the same effect as replacing the entire
interpreter with a symbolic one.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.3 [Programming Lan-
guages]: Language Constructs and Features
Keywords symbolic execution, domain-specific languages, static
analysis, web programming
1. Introduction
Symbolic execution [13, 22] is one of the oldest strategies for
reasoning about programs, and yet still forms the basis of many
modern tools [6, 17, 21, 27, 30, 31].
Building a symbolic executor, however, is difficult, and building
one that also handles concrete computation efficiently is more dif-
ficult still. Analysis tools based on symbolic execution, such as the
symbolic extension for Java PathFinder [21, 27] and the CUTE con-
colic testing engine for C [31], are capable of analyzing real-world
programs, but these tools are themselves large projects comprising
hundreds of thousands of lines of code.
The similarity of symbolic execution and standard execution
(indeed, the sharing of the very term ”execution”) suggests a sim-
pler approach, in which the standard engine is used to propagate
symbolic values, and to compute in the normal way with con-
crete values when available. The uniquely symbolic component is
achieved by introducing a library written in the target language
itself. Such a library comprises an encoding of symbolic values
and new symbolic definitions for the primitive operations of the
language, and effectively transforms the standard (concrete) imple-
mentation of the target language into a symbolic executor.
Implementing symbolic execution as a library means that con-
crete parts of the target program execute at full speed, just as they
would during concrete execution. As a result, even large programs
become amenable to symbolic execution if the number of symbolic
inputs is small. At the same time, the library-based approach elim-
inates much of the burden of building a specialized symbolic exe-
cution engine, since a small number of primitive definitions often
suffice to extend symbolic execution to the entire language.
We used this approach to build Rubicon [25], a scalable bounded
verification system for Ruby on Rails web applications, in fewer
than 1000 lines of Ruby code. Rubicon uses symbolic execution to
derive verification conditions from specifications of a web appli-
cation’s behavior and its implementation, then uses the Alloy An-
alyzer to check the derived conditions. Because web applications
typically have only a few variable inputs, the number of symbolic
inputs to Rubicon’s symbolic execution is low, and so Rubicon’s
analysis scales to large applications. Despite its small size, Rubi-
con has been used to find previously unknown bugs in open-source
Rails applications.
The contributions of this paper include:
• A new technique for implementing symbolic execution, in
which symbolic values and operations are encapsulated in a
library written in the target language itself;
• A formal description of this approach, applied to the untyped
λ-calculus with side effects;
• An informal proof that the formal description provided corre-
sponds to the standard semantics of symbolic execution;
• A description of the implementation of Rubicon, a tool that per-
forms bounded verification of Ruby-on-Rails web applications
using this strategy.
2. Rubicon
Rubicon [25] is a library for writing and checking specifications
for Ruby on Rails [18] web applications. Rubicon provides an em-
bedded domain-specific language for programmers to specify web
application behavior, and performs automated bounded analysis to
check those specifications against the application’s implementa-
tion.
Rubicon’s specification language is based on the RSpec [9] test-
ing library for Ruby; Rubicon extends RSpec with first-order quan-
tifiers to allow the expression of general specifications. Rubicon’s
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similarity to RSpec is intentional, and is intended to encourage
RSpec users to write specifications. The following is an example
of a Rubicon specification for the open-source customer relation-
ship management system Fat Free CRM:
1 describe ContactsController do
2 it ”should not display other users ’ private
opportunities ” do
3 User. forall do |u|
4 Contact. forall do |c |
5 Opportunity. forall do |o|
6 set current user (u)
7 get :show, : id => c.id
8 (o. access == ’private’ and
9 o.user != u). implies do
10 assigns [: contact ]. opportunities should not
11 include o
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 end
This specification checks that when a contact is displayed, the
private opportunities associated with the contact are not displayed
unless the logged-in user owns them. Rubicon’s symbolic evaluator
transforms this specification into the following verification condi-
tion:
1 Exp( forall , [User,
2 Exp( forall , [Contact,
3 Exp( forall , [Opportunity,
4 Exp(implies , [
5 Exp(and, [Exp(==, [Exp( field ref , [o, : access ]) ,
6 ’ private ’ ]) ,
7 Exp(!=, [Exp( field ref , [o, : user ]) ,
8 u]) ]) ,
9 Exp(not,
10 [Exp(include , [Exp( field ref , [c,
: opportunities ]) ,
11 o]) ]) ]) ]) ]) ])
Rubicon uses this simple abstract-syntax tree representation
internally; a Rubicon user would instead see the following pretty-
printed verification condition:
1 all u: User, c: Contact, o: Opportunity |
2 o. access = ’ private ’ and o.user != u implies
3 not (o in c. opportunities )
This formula is obviously false, meaning that Fat Free CRM has
a bug. Any value for c such that c.opportunities contains a private
opportunity not owned by u represents a counterexample. This sit-
uation does, in fact, reflect a bug in Fat Free CRM: after checking
the permissions on the contact being displayed, the system displays
all of the associated opportunities, without checking their permis-
sions. This bug was previously unknown, and has since been fixed
by the Fat Free CRM developers.
Rubicon’s symbolic execution is implemented as a library in
fewer than 1000 lines of Ruby. Symbolic variables are represented
using a distinguished class of objects, and methods invoked on
those objects are defined so as to return symbolic expressions like
the one listed above. Having loaded the Rubicon library, executing
the specification above in the standard Ruby interpreter produces
the associated symbolic expression. Taking this approach greatly
reduced both the size and development time of Rubicon.
2.1 A Simple Symbolic Evaluator
To illustrate the ease with which symbolic execution can be im-
plemented in Ruby, we construct a simple symbolic evaluator for
side-effect free programs. We first introduce a class to represent
symbolic values, and a descendent of that class to represent sym-
bolic expressions:
1 class SymbolicObject
2 def method missing(meth, ∗args)
3 Exp.new(meth, [self ] + args)
4 end
5
6 def ==(other)
7 Exp.new(:equals, [ self , other ])
8 end
9 end
10
11 class Exp < SymbolicObject
12 def initialize ( rator , rands)
13 @rator = rator
14 @rands = rands
15 end
16 end
An instance of “SymbolicObject” represents a symbolic vari-
able. The class defines the “method missing” method so that an
arbitrary method invocation on a symbolic object yields a symbolic
expression representing that invocation. For example, the following
program:
1 x = SymbolicObject.new
2 y = SymbolicObject.new
3 x.foo(y)
Produces the following symbolic expression:
1 Exp(foo, [x, y ])
We have also defined the “==” method, because invoking this
method will not trigger a call to “method missing” since equality
is defined for all objects. Consider the following similar program,
for example:
1 x = SymbolicObject.new
2 y = SymbolicObject.new
3 x + y == y + x
This program produces the symbolic expression:
1 Exp(==, [Exp(+, [x, y]) , Exp(+, [y, x ]) ])
2.1.1 Conditionals
Handling conditionals is a key part of symbolic execution, since the
system must execute both branches of conditional that depends on
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a symbolic value. In the ideal implementation of Ruby, we could
write the following definition of “ if ” as a call-by-name function:
1 def if ( condition , then do, else do )
2 c = condition. call
3 if c. is a ? SymbolicObject then
4 Exp.new(: if , [c, then do. call , else do . call ])
5 else
6 if c then then do. call else else do . call end
7 end
8 end
This definition would enable the user to write code like the
following:
1 x = SymbolicObject.new
2 if x.even? then
3 (x+1).odd?
4 end
Which would evaluate to the following symbolic expression:
1 Exp( if , [Exp(even?, [x ]) , Exp(odd?, [Exp(+, [x, 1]) ]) ])
The reality of Ruby’s implementation makes handling condi-
tionals slightly more complicated. By default, Ruby does not al-
low the programmer to redefine “ if .” To solve this problem, we
use a library called VIRTUAL KEYWORDS [29], which was devel-
oped with the motivation of handling conditionals in Rubicon. VIR-
TUAL KEYWORDS allows the programmer to redefine Ruby’s hard-
coded keywords, including “ if .” When one of these redefinitions is
called, its arguments are passed inside of blocks to simulate call-
by-name function invocation.
2.2 A More Complicated Evaluator: Handling Side Effects
Supporting side effects in the presence of symbolic values requires
a significant change to the way conditionals are handled. Since
both branches of the conditional may contain updates to the same
variable, it becomes necessary to save both values, along with the
path condition under which the variable takes a particular value.
We begin by adding a representation of symbolic state, which
we store in symbolic objects themselves. We add a method to
symbolic objects that adds a new possible value, along with the
associated path condition, to the symbolic state:
1 class SymbolicObject
2 def initialize
3 @vals = []
4 end
5
6 def add val(cond, val )
7 @vals << [cond,val]
8 end
9 end
To handle side effects properly, the new definition of “ if ” must
save the current state, execute the conditional’s first branch, update
the symbolic state based on the updates made during that execution,
and repeat the process for the second branch. In addition, the
path condition must be set appropriately for the execution of each
branch, and used in updating the symbolic state.
1 def get state (binding)
2 Hash[eval(” local variables ”, binding) .
3 map{|var| [ var , eval (var , binding) ]}]
4 end
5
6 def save state (binding)
7 state = get state(binding)
8
9 state . each pair do |var , val |
10 eval (var + ” old = ” + var, binding)
11 end
12
13 get state (binding)
14 end
15
16
17 def update state( state , state1 , binding)
18 state1 . each pair do |var , val |
19 if val .equal? state [ var ] then
20 # no change
21 else
22 if state [ var ]. is a ? SymbolicObject then
23 eval (var + ” = ” + var + ” old”, binding)
24 state [ var ]. add val( $path condition , val )
25 else
26 eval (var + ” = SymbolicObject.new”, binding)
27 new obj = eval(var , binding)
28 new obj.add val(true , state [ var ]) if state [ var ]
29 new obj.add val( $path condition , val )
30 end
31 end
32 end
33 end
34
35 def if ( condition , then do, else do )
36 c = condition. call
37 if c. is a ? SymbolicObject then
38 pc = $path condition
39
40 state = save state(then do.binding)
41 $path condition = Exp.new(:and, [c, pc])
42 v1 = then do. call
43 state1 = get state(then do.binding)
44 update state( state , state1 , then do.binding)
45
46 state = save state( else do . binding)
47 $path condition = Exp.new(:and, [Exp.new(:not,
[c ]) , pc])
48 v2 = else do. call
49 state2 = get state( else do . binding)
50 update state( state , state2 , else do . binding)
51
52 $path condition = pc
53 Exp.new(: if , [c, v1, v2])
54 else
55 if c then then do. call else else do . call end
56 end
57 end
Figure 1. Redefinition of “ if ” to Handle Side Effects
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Figure 1 contains a definition of “ if ” that handles side effects.
It works by saving the current state, updating the path condition
based on the branch being executed, executing the branch, and
updating the symbolic state based on the updates to the concrete
state. Because it is impossible to set the value of a variable stored in
a Ruby Binding object directly, the “ save state ” procedure saves a
copy of each variable with the suffix “ old” and the “update state”
procedure uses these copies to retrieve previous values of updated
variables.
This redefinition allows the programmer to write code like the
following:
1 x = SymbolicObject.new
2 y = SymbolicObject.new
3 if x.even? then
4 y = true
5 else
6 y = false
7 end
Executing this program gives the variable “y” the following
symbolic state:
1 Exp(even?, [x ]) => true,
2 Exp(not, [Exp(even?, [x ]) ]) => false
This symbolic state represents the two possibilities for “y:” if
“x” is even, then the value of “y” will be true; otherwise, it will be
false .
2.3 Stubbing Rails
Rails web applications interact with a persistent database through
ActiveRecord, an object-relational mapper. In general, the proper-
ties of Rails applications that Rubicon checks should be true for all
configurations of the database. As a result, Rubicon must treat the
database as symbolic data when checking properties.
Fortunately, Rails enforces the use of the ActiveRecord inter-
face for accessing the database, so we can simply provide a new
implementation of that interface which returns symbolic values in-
stead of actual database records. In a Rails application, objects to be
stored in the database extend ActiveRecord, and the ActiveRecord
class provides methods such as “find” and “ all ” to query the
database for records representing objects of the receiver’s type. For
example, given the following User class:
1 class User < ActiveRecord::Base
2 end
A Rails application could find all users with the name “Joe” using
the following expression, which evaluates to a list of records with
the given property:
1 User. find :name => ”Joe”
Our goal is for expressions like these to evaluate to symbolic
expressions representing the database query itself. The obvious
way to accomplish this is to use Ruby’s open classes to redefine
“find” and the other querying methods of ActiveRecord. Unfor-
tunately, Rails prevents this approach by defining the methods on
ActiveRecord objects dynamically. At runtime, then, our redefini-
tions would be overwritten with the originals as defined by Rails.
Rails defines methods dynamically so that each ActiveRecord ob-
1 class TypedSymbolicObject < SymbolicObject
2 def initialize (type)
3 @type = type
4 end
5 end
6
7 klasses = ActiveRecord::Base.descendants
8
9 klasses .each do | klass |
10 metaklass = class << klass; self ; end
11 metaklass.send(:define method, :new, lambda {
TypedSymbolicObject.new(self) })
12 metaklass.send(:define method, :my, lambda {
TypedSymbolicObject.new(self) })
13 metaklass.send(:define method, : all , lambda {
TypedSymbolicObject.new(self) })
14 ...
15
16 klass .column names.each do |name|
17 klass .send(:define method, name.to sym, lambda {
Exp.new(:field get , [ self , name.to sym]) })
18 klass .send(:define method, (name + ”=”).to sym,
lambda {|arg| Exp.new(: field set , [ self ,
name.to sym, arg]) })
19 end
20
21 klass . reflect on all associations .each do |assoc |
22 klass .send(:define method, assoc.name, lambda {
Exp.new(:field get , [ self , assoc.name]) })
23 end
24 end
Figure 2. Code to Stub Rails Database Accessor Methods
ject responds to a set of methods representing the fields of the cor-
responding database records. Given a User object “u,” for example,
the expression u.name evaluates to the name field of the database
record corresponding to the user “u.”
The solution is to employ dynamic redefinition ourselves. We
redefine each instance method corresponding to a database field so
as to return a symbolic expression, and we redefine the class meth-
ods for constructing database queries to return symbolic queries.
Figure 2 contains the code used to perform this step, along with
a definition of typed symbolic objects. The code works by redefin-
ing both the class methods and instance methods of ActiveRecord’s
descendents. Lines 10-13 show how some of the database query
methods are redefined. Lines 16-19 redefine the getters and setters
for the database field methods of the class, and lines 21-23 do the
same for the associations—relationships with other objects through
a separate database table—belonging to the class.
With this redefinition, we can symbolically execute code like
the following definition of the “show” method of the “User” con-
troller of Fat Free CRM, which method starts by fetching the user
associated with the provided ID:
1 class UsersController < ApplicationController
2 def show
3 @user = User.my.find(params[: id ])
4 ...
5 end
6 end
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Given a symbolic ID, the “@user” variable will get the value:
1 Exp(:find , [Exp(:query, [User]) , SymbolicObject1])
2.4 Writing Specifications
Rubicon also provides the user with a language for writing down
properties to be checked. Rubicon borrows much of this language
from RSpec, with“ forall ” being the only new language feature.
We also redefine RSpec’s “should” method to produce symbolic
expressions.
2.4.1 Quantifiers
Symbolic values in Rubicon specifications are constructed through
the use of quantifiers. We define the “ forall ” quantifier, for exam-
ple, by using Ruby’s open classes facility to define a new method
for all objects:
1 class Object
2 def forall (&block)
3 Exp.new(: forall , [ self ,
block. call (TypedSymbolicObject.new(self))])
4 end
5 end
This definition allows the programmer to quantify over objects; the
typical use is to quantify over a class. The “ forall ” method takes
a block and invokes it, passing a new symbolic object whose type
information is represented by the receiver of the method call. For
example:
1 Integer . forall do | i |
2 Integer . forall do | j |
3 i + j == j + i
4 end
5 end
This expression evaluates to the following symbolic expression:
1 Exp( forall , [ Integer , Exp( forall , [ Integer ,
Exp(equals, [Exp(+, [i , j ]) , Exp(+, [j , i ]) ]) ]) ])
2.4.2 Should
RSpec provides the “should” and “should not” methods to con-
struct assertions. We redefine these methods to construct symbolic
assertions as follows:
1 class SymbolicObject
2 def should(matcher = nil, message = nil)
3 Exp.new(:should, [ self ,
matcher. instance variable get ( ’@name’),
matcher. instance variable get ( ’@expected’)])
4 end
5
6 def should not(matcher = nil, message = nil)
7 Exp.new(:should not, [ self ,
matcher. instance variable get ( ’@name’),
matcher. instance variable get ( ’@expected’)])
8 end
9 end
Figure 3. Rubicon Specification Compared to RSpec Test
The following expression says that all users should be included
in the list of users obtained from the database:
1 User. forall do |u|
2 User. all . should include? u
3 end
This expression evaluates to the following symbolic expression:
1 Exp(:should, [Exp(: all , [User]) , include ?,
SymbolicObject1])
2.5 Putting it All Together
The diagram in Figure 3 compares the model for RSpec testing to
that of Rubicon’s specifications. Like RSpec tests, Rubicon spec-
ifications invoke Rails controllers, and through them, the stan-
dard Rails and Ruby libraries. Unlike RSpec tests, however, Rubi-
con specifications are written using domain-specific language con-
structs that produce symbolic expressions, and are executed in an
environment that wraps the standard libraries, allowing those li-
braries to compute with symbolic values.
The remaining piece of Rubicon’s architecture is the constraint
solver used to solve the verification conditions generated by Rubi-
con’s symbolic execution. Rubicon uses the Alloy Analyzer [34], a
bounded analysis tool for the Alloy language [20]. Alloy is a spec-
ification language based on first-order relational logic with tran-
sitive closure. The language is a perfect match for the relational-
database-oriented verification conditions generated by Rubicon,
and the bounded analysis performed by the Alloy Analyzer is guar-
anteed to terminate even in the presence of quantifiers.
Another constraint solver, such as an SMT solver, model
checker, or even interactive theorem prover, could just as easily
fill this role. In exchange for giving up the Alloy Analyzer’s push-
button automation, another solver may be able to provide an un-
bounded proof of Rubicon’s verification conditions.
3. Formalizing Rubicon
To illustrate our approach, we apply it to the untyped λ-calculus
and compare the resulting embedding with the standard symbolic
semantics. For simplicity, we begin with a side-effect free target
language, to which we later add side effects.
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3.1 Untyped λ-calculus
In this section, we apply our approach to the side-effect-free un-
typed λ-calculus. We adopt the standard syntax and semantics, as
well as the conventions, of Pierce [28]; we present the syntax and
semantics in Figure 4.
We formalize the standard notion of symbolic execution in Fig-
ure 5. This formalization adds symbolic values to the existing con-
crete ones, and adds evaluation rules for terms containing symbolic
values. We use s to denote the class of symbolic values, which may
be either symbolic variables or symbolic expressions containing an
arbitrary number of symbolic or concrete values. The result of a
symbolic execution under these semantics will be a concrete value
if no symbolic values are involved, or a symbolic expression if com-
putation using symbols is performed.
Because the target language omits side effects, no notion of
symbolic state or a global path constraint is required. The resulting
symbolic expression itself represents the condition necessary for
the given term to yield a particular value. For example, consider
the following term and its value under the symbolic semantics:
t = if iszero s1then 0 else succ 0
∗→ Exp(if, Exp(iszero, s1), 0, succ 0)
The resulting symbolic expression alone represents the possible
results of executing t concretely: if the input variable is zero, then
the result is zero; otherwise, it is zero’s successor.
Figure 6 contains our approach to symbolic execution for the
pure untyped λ-calculus. Our approach comprises a set of symbolic
values—identical to the ones added in Figure 5—and a set of
redefinitions for the primitive operations of the language. Aside
from the addition of symbolic values, this implementation can be
executed directly under the standard semantics in Figure 4. This
approach also works in languages without symbolic values, by
encoding symbolic values in a form the language does support. Our
implementation in Ruby, for example, uses a special set of classes
to represent symbolic values.
Using our approach also requires the ability to selectively rede-
fine language primitives, including “if.” Many existing languages
make this possible, and there are workarounds for some of those
(like Ruby) that do not. When programs are side-effect free, in-
vocations of these primitives can be either call-by-value or call-
by-name; when side effects are introduced, call-by-name must be
used.
Our approach produces the same results as the traditional sym-
bolic semantics shown in Figure 5. The example given above, for
example, evaluates as follows under the standard semantics with
our redefinitions:
t = if iszero s1 then 0 else succ 0
∗→θ if sym? Exp(iszero, s1)
then Exp(if, Exp(iszero, s1), 0, succ 0)
else if (iszero s1) then 0 else succ 0
→θ if true
then Exp(if, Exp(iszero, s1), 0, succ 0)
else if (iszero s1) then 0 else succ 0
→θ then Exp(if, Exp(iszero, s1), 0, succ 0)
The proof that our approach corresponds to the symbolic seman-
tics is straightforward, and is accomplished by induction on terms.
A short version of this proof, considering only the relevant cases,
follows.
THEOREM 3.1. Let → be the transition relation of the symbolic
semantics described in Figure 5, and let →θ be the transition
relation of the standard semantics plus redefinitions of primitive
operations described in Figure 6. Then for all terms t, t ∗→ t′ ⇐⇒
t
∗→θ t′.
t ::= x | λx.t | t t
| true | false | if t then t else t
| 0 | succ t | pred t | iszero t
v ::= λx.t
| true | false
| nv
nv ::= 0 | succ nv
t1 → t′1
t1t2 → t′1t2
(APP1)
t2 → t′2
v t2 → v t′2
(APP2)
(λx.t)v → [x 7→ v]t (APPABS)
if true then t2 else t3 → t2 (IFTRUE)
if false then t2 else t3 → t3 (IFFALSE)
t1 → t′1
if t1 then t2 else t3 → if t′1 then t2 else t3
(IF)
pred 0→ 0 (PREDZERO)
iszero 0→ true (ISZEROZERO)
iszero (succ nv1)→ false (ISZEROSUCC)
pred (succ nv1)→ nv1 (PREDSUCC)
t1 → t′1
succ t1 → succ t′1
(SUCC)
t1 → t′1
pred t1 → pred t′1
(PRED)
Figure 4. Syntax and Reduction Rules for Untyped λ-calculus
with Booleans and Natural Numbers
Proof By induction on t, considering the relevant cases.
• t = if sv1 then v2 else v3. We have:
t
∗→ Exp(if, sv1, v2, v3)
and:
t →θ if sym? sv1 then Exp(if, sv1, v2, v3)
else if sv1 then v2 else v3
∗→θ Exp(if, sv1, v2, v3)
which are equivalent.
• t = pred sv1. We have:
t
∗→ Exp(pred, sv1)
and:
t →θ if sym? sv1 then Exp(pred, sv1) else pred sv1
∗→θ Exp(pred, sv1)
which are equivalent.
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v ::= ...
| sv
sv ::= sx | Exp v∗
t2 → t′2
if sv1 then t2 else t3 → if sv1 then t′2 else t3
(IFSYMB1)
t3 → t′3
if sv1 then v2 else t3 → if sv1 then v2 else t′3
(IFSYMB2)
if sv1 then v2 else v3 → Exp(if, sv1, v2, v3) (IFSYMB)
pred sv1 → Exp(pred, sv1) (PREDSYMB)
succ sv1 → Exp(succ, sv1) (SUCCSYMB)
iszero sv1 → Exp(iszero, sv1) (ISZEROSYMB)
Figure 5. Syntax and Reduction Rules for Mixed Concrete and
Symbolic Execution of Untyped λ-calculus with Booleans and
Natural Numbers
v ::= ...
| sv
sv ::= sx | Exp v∗
sym? sv1 → true (SYM)
sym? v1 → false
where v1 /∈ sv (NOTSYM)
t1 → t′1
sym? t1 → sym? t′1
(SYM2)
if = λ t,c,a. if sym? t then Exp(if, t, c, a)
else if t then c else a
pred = λ v. if sym? v then Exp(pred, v) else pred v
succ = λ v. if sym? v then Exp(succ, v) else succ v
iszero = λ v. if sym? v then Exp(iszero, v) else iszero v
Figure 6. Implementation of Primitives to Achieve Mixed Con-
crete and Symbolic Execution of Untyped λ-calculus Under Stan-
dard Semantics
• Similarly for succ and iszero.
3.2 Adding Side Effects
We now turn our attention to target languages with side effects. We
present the standard semantics for the untyped λ-calculus with side
effects in Figure 7. This formalization of mutable state introduces
the set l of labels and the store µ to hold a mapping from labels
to values. The corresponding reduction rules update the store as
a given term is reduced, and the final result of a program is rep-
resented by both the fully-reduced value of the term and the final
value of the store.
This new style of execution makes symbolic execution more
difficult. Given symbolic inputs, a program with side effects should
produce both a symbolic value and a store—but the value of the
store depends on the path taken through the program. To perform
symbolic execution, we introduce a new symbolic store σ that
represents all the possible values a symbolic variable could take,
and also records the conditions necessary for the variable to take
each of those values.
Each condition recorded in the symbolic store represents a sin-
gle path through the program, and is therefore called a path con-
straint. Symbolic execution keeps track of the current path con-
straint during execution, and uses that path constraint when updat-
ing the symbolic store.
We formalize the symbolic semantics with side effects in Fig-
ure 8. We call the current path constraint φ, and the symbolic store
is σ. The majority of the reduction rules correspond to those of the
standard semantics in Figure 7, except that the new rules propagate
the values of φ and σ.
The rules for handling assignment and conditionals have changed
significantly to deal with symbolic values. Intuitively, the rule for
“ if ” must execute both branches of the conditional, constructing
the appropriate path constraint for each branch. Rules IFSYMB1
and IFSYMB2 perform this task, using the condition’s value to ex-
tend the path constraint. When both branches have evaluated to
values, IFSYMB transforms the conditional into a symbolic expres-
sion.
The rules for assignment are responsible for extending and
merging symbolic states. The ASSIGN rule handles the entirely
concrete case, and operates just as before. ASSIGNSYMB1 handles
situations in which the variable being assigned to is not symbolic,
but its new value is dependent on a symbolic value, as in the
following program:
1 x := 5;
2 if sv then x := 6
In this case, “x” must take a symbolic value, even though it is
only assigned concrete values, since its value is dependent on the
symbolic value “sv.” ASSIGNSYMB1 constructs a new symbolic
variable for this purpose, assigns that symbolic variable to the
given location, and adds both possible values for the variable to
the symbolic state.
The final case, handled by ASSIGNSYMB2, is the situation in
which the target of an assignment is already symbolic. Consider
the following program, for example:
1 x := 5;
2 if sv then x := 6
3 else x := 7
After executing the first assignment, the symbolic state for “x”
will be:
(sv⇒ 6), (true ∧ ¬sv⇒ 5)
For the second assignment, since “x” already has a symbolic
value, we take its symbolic state and duplicate it. One copy of the
symbolic state has is path conditions conjuncted with the current
path condition, and its values replaced with the value being as-
signed (this part of the symbolic state represents all possible paths
through the program that end up going through the current path).
The other copy has its path conditions conjuncted with the negation
of the current path condition, and its values remain unchanged (this
part of the symbolic state represents the possible paths through the
program that do not end up going through the current path). After
the second assignment, then, the symbolic state for “x” is:
(sv ∧ ¬sv⇒ 7), (true ∧ ¬sv ∧ ¬sv⇒ 7),
(sv ∧ sv⇒ 6), (true ∧ ¬sv ∧ sv⇒ 5)
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Of these possible outcomes, the first and the last are impossible,
reflecting the fact that there is no way to take more than one path
through the program simultaneously, and making sure that some
path is taken (as a result, it is impossible for “x” to have the final
value 5). The rule ASSIGNSYMB2 implements this duplication
and updating process on the symbolic state, computing a σ′ that
correctly merges the possible symbolic states.
The end result of executing a program with symbolic inputs is
a symbolic value, a store µ mapping labels to symbolic variables
or concrete values, and a symbolic store σ mapping symbolic
variables to sets of values paired with path conditions.
Figure 9 contains our primitive redefinitions that produce the
same results as the symbolic semantics. Like the symbolic seman-
tics, these redefinitions keep track of the current path constraint
and symbolic state; in the absence of semantic constructs, how-
ever, these elements are encoded in the target language. The path
constraint is stored in a global variable “pc,” while the symbolic
state is encoded as a data structure tagged with the unique value
we label “SYM TAG” and is treated symbolically by the redefined
primitives.
Just as in the symbolic semantics, the major changes occur in
the definitions of assignment and conditionals. The definition of
assignment performs the same additions to the symbolic state as
the rules of the symbolic semantics do, but the redefinition places
these changes in tagged data structures inside the store, rather than
in σ. Similarly, the redefinition of conditionals modifies the path
constraint by updating its value in the store before executing the
first branch of the conditional, updates the path constraint again
before executing the second branch, and resets it before returning.
THEOREM 3.2. Let → be the transition relation of the symbolic
semantics described in Figure 8, let →θ be the transition re-
lation of the standard semantics plus redefinitions of primitive
operations described in Figure 9, and let γ be a concretization
function encoding the contents of the store and symbolic state
such that γ(µ, σ)(l) = (SYM TAG, σ(µ(l))) if µ(l) ∈ sx, and
γ(µ, σ)(l) = µ(l) otherwise. Then for all terms t, φ ` t|µ, σ ∗→
t′|µ′, σ′ ⇐⇒ t|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ) ∗→θ t′|(γ(µ′, σ′), pc = φ′).
Proof By induction on t, considering the “if” and assignment cases
involving symbolic values.
CASE 1. t = if sv1 then t2 else t3|µ, σ
By IFSYMB1, IFSYMB2, and IFSYMB, if:
φ ∧ sv1 ` t2|µ, σ ∗→ v2|µ′, σ′
φ ∧ ¬sv1 ` t3|µ′, σ′ ∗→ v3|µ′′, σ′′
Then we have that:
φ ` t|µ, σ ∗→ Exp(sv1, v2, v3)|µ′′, σ′′
By→θ , we have that:
t ::= ...
| ref t | ! t | t := t | l
v ::= ...
| unit | l
µ ::= ∅ | µ, l = v
t1|µ→ t′1|µ′
t1t2|µ→ t′1t2|µ′
(APP1)
t2|µ→ t′2|µ′
v t2|µ→ v t′2|µ′
(APP2)
(λx.t)v|µ→ [x 7→ v]t|µ (APPABS)
if true then t2 else t3|µ→ t2|µ (IFTRUE)
if false then t2 else t3|µ→ t3|µ (IFFALSE)
t1|µ→ t′1|µ′
if t1 then t2 else t3|µ→ if t′1 then t2 else t3|µ′
(IF)
pred 0|µ→ 0|µ (PREDZERO)
iszero 0|µ→ true|µ (ISZEROZERO)
iszero (succ nv1)|µ→ false|µ (ISZEROSUCC)
pred (succ nv1)|µ→ nv1|µ (PREDSUCC)
t1|µ→ t′1|µ′
succ t1|µ→ succ t′1|µ′
(SUCC)
t1|µ→ t′1|µ′
pred t1|µ→ pred t′1|µ′
(PRED)
l /∈ dom(µ)
ref v1|µ→ l|(µ, l 7→ v1) (REFV)
t1|µ→ t′1|µ′
ref t1|µ→ ref t′1|µ′
(REF)
µ(l) = v
!l|µ→ v|µ (DEREFLOC)
t1|µ→ t′1|µ′
!t1|µ→ !t′1|µ′
(DEREF)
l:=v2|µ→ unit|[l 7→ v2]µ (ASSIGN)
t1|µ→ t′1|µ′
t1:=t2|µ→ t′1:=t2|µ′
(ASSIGN1)
t2|µ→ t′2|µ′
v1:=t2|µ→ v1:=t′2|µ′
(ASSIGN2)
Figure 7. Syntax and Reduction Rules for Untyped λ-calculus
with Side Effects
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v ::= ...
| sv
sv ::= sx | Exp v∗
σ ::= ∅ | σ, sx = {φ, v}
φ ` t1|µ, σ → t′1|µ′, σ′
φ ` t1t2|µ, σ → t′1t2|µ′, σ′
(APP1)
φ ` t2|µ, σ → t′2|µ′, σ′
φ ` v t2|µ, σ → v t′2|µ′, σ′
(APP2)
φ ` (λx.t)v|µ, σ → [x 7→ v]t|µ, σ (APPABS)
φ ` if true then t2 else t3|µ, σ → t2|µ, σ (IFTRUE)
φ ` if false then t2 else t3|µ, σ → t3|µ, σ (IFFALSE)
φ ` t1|µ, σ → t′1|µ′, σ′
φ ` if t1 then t2 else t3|µ, σ →
if t′1 then t2 else t3|µ′, σ′
(IF)
φ ` pred 0|µ, σ → 0|µ, σ (PREDZERO)
φ ` iszero 0|µ, σ → true|µ, σ (ISZEROZERO)
φ ` iszero (succ nv1)|µ, σ → false|µ, σ (ISZEROSUCC)
φ ` pred (succ nv1)|µ, σ → nv1|µ, σ (PREDSUCC)
φ ` t1|µ, σ → t′1|µ′, σ′
φ ` succ t1|µ, σ → succ t′1|µ′, σ′
(SUCC)
φ ` t1|µ, σ → t′1|µ′, σ′
φ ` pred t1|µ, σ → pred t′1|µ′, σ′
(PRED)
l /∈ dom(µ)
φ ` ref v1|µ, σ → l|(µ, l 7→ v1), σ (REFV)
φ ` t1|µ, σ → t′1|µ′, σ′
φ ` ref t1|µ, σ → ref t′1|µ′, σ′
(REF)
µ(l) = v
φ ` !l|µ, σ → v|µ, σ (DEREFLOC)
φ ` t1|µ, σ → t′1|µ′, σ′
φ ` !t1|µ, σ → !t′1|µ′, σ′
(DEREF)
φ ` t1|µ, σ → t′1|µ′, σ′
φ ` t1:=t2|µ, σ → t′1:=t2|µ′, σ′
(ASSIGN1)
φ ` t2|µ, σ → t′2|µ′, σ′
φ ` v1:=t2|µ, σ → v1:=t′2|µ′, σ′
(ASSIGN2)
µ(l) /∈ sx
true ` l:=v2|µ, σ → unit|[l 7→ v2]µ, σ (ASSIGN)
µ(l) /∈ sx φ 6= true sx1 /∈ dom(σ)
φ ` l:=v2|µ, σ →
unit|[l 7→ sx1]µ, (σ, sx1 7→ {(φ, v2), (¬φ, µ(l))})
(ASSIGNSYMB1)
µ(l) = sx1
φ ` l:=v2|µ, σ → unit|µ, σ′
where σ′ = [sx1 7→ {(φ ∧ φ′, v2)|(φ′, v) ∈ σ(sx1)}∪
{(¬φ ∧ φ′, v)|(φ′, v) ∈ σ(sx1)}]σ
(ASSIGNSYMB2)
φ ` pred sv1|µ, σ → Exp(pred, sv1)|µ, σ (PREDSYMB)
φ ` succ sv1|µ, σ → Exp(succ, sv1)|µ, σ (SUCCSYMB)
φ ` iszero sv1|µ, σ → Exp(iszero, sv1)|µ, σ (ISZEROSYMB)
φ ∧ sv1 ` t2|µ, σ → t′2|µ′, σ′
φ ` if sv1 then t2 else t3|µ, σ →
if sv1 then t
′
2 else t3|µ′, σ′
(IFSYMB1)
φ ∧ ¬sv1 ` t3|µ, σ → t′3|µ′, σ′
φ ` if sv1 then t2 else t3|µ, σ →
if sv1 then t2 else t
′
3|µ′, σ′
(IFSYMB2)
φ ` if sv1 then v2 else v3|µ, σ →
Exp(if, sv1, v2, v3)|µ, σ (IFSYMB)
Figure 8. Syntax and Reduction Rules for Mixed Concrete and Symbolic Execution of Untyped λ-calculus with Side Effects
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v ::= ...
| sv | µ
sv ::= sx | Exp v∗
:= = λ a, b.
if sym? !a then
a:=sym({(!pc ∧ pc’, b)|(pc’,v) ∈ !a} ∪
{(¬!pc ∧ pc’, v)|(pc’,v) ∈ !a})
else if !pc != true then
a:=sym({(pc, b), (¬pc, !a)})
else a := b
if = λ c, t, e.
if sym? c then
let old pc = !pc in
pc := old pc ∧ c;
let v1 = t.call in
pc := old pc ∧ ¬c;
let v2 = e.call in
pc := old pc;
Exp(if, c, v1, v2)
else if c then t.call else e.call
sym = λ vals. (SYM TAG, vals)
sym? = λ v. v = (SYM TAG, vals) or sym? v
pred = λ v. if sym? v then Exp(pred, v) else pred v
succ = λ v. if sym? v then Exp(succ, v) else succ v
iszero = λ v. if sym? v then Exp(iszero, v) else iszero v
Figure 9. Implementation of Primitives to Achieve Mixed Con-
crete and Symbolic Execution of Untyped λ-calculus with Side Ef-
fects Under Standard Semantics
t|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ if sym? sv1 then ... else ...|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ pc := φ ∧ sv1; ...|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ let v1 = t2.call in ...|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ ∧ sv1)
∗→θ let v1 = v2 in ...|(γ(µ′, σ′), pc 7→ φ ∧ sv1)
(by inductive hypothesis)
∗→θ pc := φ ∧ ¬sv1; ...|(γ(µ′, σ′), pc 7→ φ ∧ sv1)
∗→θ let v2 = t3.call in ...|(γ(µ′, σ′), pc 7→ φ ∧ ¬sv1)
∗→θ let v2 = v3 in ...|(γ(µ′′, σ′′), pc 7→ φ ∧ ¬sv1)
(by inductive hypothesis)
∗→θ pc := φ; ...|(γ(µ′′, σ′′), pc 7→ φ ∧ ¬sv1)
∗→θ Exp(sv1, v2, v3)|(γ(µ′′, σ′′), pc 7→ φ)
CASE 2. t = l:=v2|µ, σ where µ(l) /∈ sx and φ = true.
By ASSIGN, we have:
true ` t|µ, σ ∗→ unit|[l 7→ v2]µ, σ
By→θ:
t|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ l := v2|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ unit|[l 7→ v2](γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
= unit|(γ([l 7→ v2]µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
CASE 3. t = l:=v2|µ, σ where µ(l) /∈ sx and φ 6= true.
By ASSIGNSYMB1, we have:
φ ` t|µ, σ ∗→ unit|[l 7→ sx1]µ, (σ, sx1 7→ {(φ, v2), (¬φ, µ(l))})
By→θ:
t|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ l := sym({(φ, v2), (¬φ, !l)})|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ l := sym({(φ, v2), (¬φ, µ(l))})|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
(because µ(l) /∈ sx)
∗→θ l := (SYM TAG, {(φ, v2), (¬φ, µ(l))})|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ unit|[l 7→ (SYM TAG, {(φ, v2), (¬φ, µ(l))})](γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
= unit|(γ([l 7→ sx1]µ, (σ, sx1 7→ {(φ, v2), (¬φ, µ(l))})), pc 7→ φ)
(by definition of γ)
CASE 4. t = l:=v2|µ, σ where µ(l) = sx1.
By ASSIGNSYMB2, we have:
φ ` t|µ, σ ∗→ unit|µ, σ′
where σ′ = [sx1 7→ {(φ ∧ φ′, v2)|(φ′, v) ∈ σ(sx1)}∪
{(¬φ ∧ φ′, v)|(φ′, v) ∈ σ(sx1)}]σ
By→θ:
t|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ l:=sym({(φ ∧ pc’, v2)|(pc’,v) ∈ !l} ∪
{(¬φ ∧ pc’, v)|(pc’,v) ∈ !l})|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ l:=sym({(φ ∧ pc’, v2)|(pc’,v) ∈ σ(sx1)} ∪
{(¬φ ∧ pc’, v)|(pc’,v) ∈ σ(sx1)})|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
(since µ(l) = sx1, γ(µ, σ)(l) = σ(sx1))
∗→θ l:=(SYM TAG, {(φ ∧ pc’, v2)|(pc’,v) ∈ σ(sx1)} ∪
{(¬φ ∧ pc’, v)|(pc’,v) ∈ σ(sx1)})|(γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
∗→θ unit|[l 7→ (SYM TAG, S)](γ(µ, σ), pc 7→ φ)
where S ={(φ ∧ pc’, v2)|(pc’,v) ∈ σ(sx1)} ∪
{(¬φ ∧ pc’, v)|(pc’,v) ∈ σ(sx1)})
= unit|(γ(µ, σ′), pc 7→ φ)
(by definition of γ)
The remaining cases are straightforward.
4. Related Work
Research on symbolic execution has a long history, with the first
systems due to King [22] and to Clarke [13], both in 1976. Interest
in symbolic execution has continued, and new developments have
greatly increased the scalability of symbolic execution engines [6,
17, 21, 27, 30, 31].
Two notable examples of modern symbolic execution systems
are the symbolic extension of Java PathFinder [21, 27], which has
been used to analyze Java code used by NASA, and CUTE [31],
a “concolic” testing tool for C that interleaves invocations of a
symbolic and concrete execution.
The recent popularity of dynamic languages has lead to a corre-
sponding interest in symbolic execution for these languages. Sax-
ena et. al [30] perform symbolic execution on Javascript programs,
for example, to discover malware; Rozzle [14] is a similar effort
that uses symbolic execution along with other techniques to detect
malicious Javascript.
Embedding symbolic values directly in the target language is
not without precedent. The Jeeves system [36] is designed to en-
force security policies, and is implemented as a library in Scala.
Jeeves provides symbolic values with which to build policies, but
policies are written in a subset of Scala. Ko¨skal et. al [23] also
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embed symbolic values in Scala; they use symbolic values in per-
forming constraint programming.
Austin et. al [3] propose virtual values, and allow the program-
mer to provide definitions for primitive operations over these val-
ues. Such a mechanism provides the perfect platform on which to
build library-based alternative execution models like our approach
to symbolic execution.
Rubicon’s specification language is based on the RSpec domain-
specific language for testing [9], and its philosophy is most heavily
influenced by QuickCheck [12], a random testing framework for
Haskell. Rubicon’s back-end solver is based on Alloy [20], which
is itself based on the Kodkod relational model finder [34].
Existing work applying formal methods to web applications has
focused on modeling navigation between pages [1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15,
24, 33, 35]. A smaller but growing body of work (e.g. [2, 19,
32]) focuses on building formal models of the behavior of web
applications.
Work whose goals are closest to those of Rubicon include Chli-
pala’s Ur/Web [11], which statically verifies user-defined secu-
rity properties of web applications, and Chaudhuri and Foster’s
work [8], which verifies the absence of some particular security
vulnerabilities for Rails applications. Nijjar and Bultan [26] trans-
late Rails data models into Alloy to find inconsistencies, but do not
check behavior.
5. Conclusion
We have presented a new approach to symbolic execution in which
the standard implementation of the target language is used both to
propagate symbolic values, and to compute in the normal way with
concrete values when available. We implement this approach as a
library written in the target language itself; this library comprises
an encoding of symbolic values and new symbolic definitions for
the primitive operations of the language, and effectively transforms
the standard (concrete) implementation of the target language into
a symbolic executor.
We used this approach to build Rubicon, a scalable bounded
verification system for Ruby on Rails web applications, in fewer
than 1000 lines of Ruby code. Despite its small size, Rubicon has
been used to find previously unknown bugs in open-source Rails
applications.
We might never have considered this approach to symbolic exe-
cution if not for the rich extensibility offered by Ruby. Most main-
stream languages now offer at least limited facilities for building
embedded domain-specific languages, and many, including Ruby,
go farther, allowing the programmer to redefine even the language’s
most primitive operations.
We hope the trend towards greater language extensibility con-
tinues. While it is possible to misuse the power that comes with a
truly extensible language, surely that power is worth the risk if it
enables as powerful a technique as symbolic execution to be imple-
mented in as small a library as Rubicon.
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